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INTRODUCTION  
Since its inception in 2005, the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) has 
changed the framework for doing business in Europe’s power sector and energy intensive 
industries. The policy limits the annual aggregate emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) by 
allocating a certain amount of pollution permits, called European Union Allowances (EUAs), to 
each participating emitter. At the end of each year, emitters must surrender an EUA for each ton 
of CO2 emitted, but they are free to buy additional EUAs or sell excess EUAs on an international 
permit market.  The primary goal of this cap-and-trade policy is to achieve a given reduction 
target for  aggregate CO2 emissions at minimal cost. A longer-term objective is to stimulate 
innovation that will help with the transition to a low-carbon economy.   
A thorough understanding of how regulated firms have responded to the EU ETS is crucial 
for improving not only this specific policy but also carbon trading schemes in other parts of the 
world (e.g. the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the United States). The first ten years of 
carbon trading in Europe have generated large amounts of data suitable for a sweeping ex-post 
analysis of the effectiveness and success of the EU ETS. However, no single study has been able 
to accomplish this formidable task. Thus, the purpose of this article, which is part of a 
symposium on the EU ETS,1 is to summarize and evaluate the existing ex-post literature on the 
EU ETS, focusing in particular on the impact of the EU ETS on the CO2 emissions, economic 
performance and competitiveness, and innovation of regulated firms in the industrial and power 
sectors.  
An ideal evaluation of the EU ETS would combine a representative firm or plant-level dataset 
of sufficient detail with a study design that attributes to the EU ETS only those observed 
behavioral changes it has actually caused. It is difficult to solve this identification problem 
                                                
1 The other articles in the symposium are Ellerman, Marantonini, and Zaklan (2016), which introduces the 
symposium and provides a broad overview of the EU ETS, and Hintermann, Peterson, and Rickels (2016), which 
reviews the literature on price and market behavior during Phase II of the EU ETS. 
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because there are so many factors that might simultaneously affect firm behavior, thus 
confounding the impact estimate. The state-of-the-art solution would be to conduct a 
randomized-control trial, or field experiment (e.g., Greenstone and Gayer, 2009). As in other 
real-world settings, however, randomizing participation in the EU ETS is neither desirable nor 
politically feasible. Thus, evaluations of the EU ETS have generally relied on more traditional 
econometric techniques2 to estimate the average effect of the EU ETS on treated (i.e., regulated) 
firms, which implicitly assume that the EU ETS has no effect on untreated (i.e., unregulated) 
firms. This is a strong assumption because if the EU ETS were  to cause output prices in the 
electricity sector to rise, those price increases would be likely to affect the industrial sector as a 
whole, thus blurring the distinction between treated and untreated firms. While the direct impact 
of the EU ETS can be estimated by comparing participating firms to suitable controls among 
non-participants, it is very challenging to separately identify the specific impact of higher 
electricity prices. Although the studies we review in this article all focus on estimating the direct 
impact of the EU ETS on power plants and industrial plants, it is important to recognize that the 
estimated impact of the EU ETS on industrial polluters also includes its indirect impact via 
higher electricity prices. 
Our choice of studies to include in our review was based on a systematic search of the 
scholarly literature and the application of well-defined criteria.3 While we considered both 
published and unpublished research, all of the papers included in our review are original research 
studies based on actual data collected ex post (i.e., during the treatment period). This rules out 
review papers, policy briefs, and analytical papers based on simulations.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next three sections review the 
research findings concerning the impacts of the EU ETS on emissions abatement, economic 
performance and competitiveness, and innovation, respectively. Within each section, we place 
                                                
2 These approaches include matching, regression discontinuity design, and instrumental variable (IV) estimation. 
3  For more details on this process, see the on-line Supplementary Materials. 
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more weight on studies that seek to establish causality. The final section summarizes the main 
findings and suggests priorities for future research on the EU ETS 
 
IMPACT OF THE EU ETS ON EMISSIONS ABATEMENT  
Given the objectives of the EU ETS, measuring the policy’s impact on emissions is crucial. By 
definition, a cap-and-trade system like the EU ETS will produce emission reductions as long as 
the cap is set tightly enough and regulated emitters are not in gross violation of the scheme. 
However, this does not mean that an observed decline in emissions can automatically be 
attributed to the ETS. In many industries and countries, emissions have been declining for some 
time. For example, in the UK, emissions decreased by 29.8% between 1990 and 2013 (see Figure 
1). Moreover, macroeconomic fluctuations such as the recent recession affect emissions, 
sometimes drastically. Thus, one should consider an emissions trading scheme to be effective 
only if it leads to emissions that are lower than would have been the case without the policy. 
Researchers seeking to estimate the impact of the EU ETS on emissions in the power or 
industrial sector have encountered two major challenges. First, for installations included in the 
EU ETS, data on emissions prior to 2005 were not readily available. Second, a suitable measure 
of counterfactual emissions is needed. Several methods to measure pre-2005 emissions and 
estimate this counterfactual (i.e., business as usual – BAU – emissions) have been proposed in 
the literature. We review three major strands of this literature: estimates based on aggregate 
emissions; estimates based on emission data at the firm or plant level; and qualitative studies 
based on interviews and case studies.  
 
Figure 1: UK Emissions 1990 – 2013 
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Notes: 1990 is taken as base year. The Kyoto target is in terms of total GHG emissions. The 
government target is in terms of CO2.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Department for Energy and Climate Change, “Final UK 
greenhouse gas emissions national statistics 1990-2013 Excel data tables”.  
  
Estimates Based on Aggregate Emissions 
Emissions aggregated at the sector level have been used to estimate the impact of the different 
Phases of the EU ETS on both industrial emissions and the electricity sector.  
Phase I emissions 
 
Three sources of data have been used to estimate pre-2005 emissions in order to construct the 
counterfactual BAU for the 2005-2007 (i.e., Phase I) period. The estimates and their data sources 
are summarized in Table 1. First, focusing on the first two years of Phase I (2005-2006), 
Ellerman and Buchner (2007, 2008) extrapolate pre-2005 emissions data from National 
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Allocation Plans (NAPs)4 by taking into account GDP growth and the decreasing trend in the 
carbon intensity of production (i.e., emissions/GDP). However, there are two problems with the 
NAP data. The first problem is that the data were collected under time pressure, with minimal 
verification by authorities. Thus, installations had an incentive to inflate emissions if they 
expected that doing so would give them a more generous allocation of EUAs. The second 
problem is that the data are not perfectly comparable across countries because different 
calculation methods and base years were used for different countries. Ellerman and Buchner 
(2008) estimate that CO2 emissions were reduced by between 100 and 200 million tonnes across 
all EU ETS sectors and countries in the 2005-2006 period, which corresponds to a total 
abatement rate of between 2.4% and 4.7%.  
Table 1: Estimates of Phase I abatement based on aggregate emissions data 
                                                
4 In Phases I and II of the EU ETS, each member state drew up a National Allocation Plan (NAP) that 
fixed the national cap and determined the sectoral permit allocation. 
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Second, Herold (2007) uses adjusted United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) common reporting format (CRF) data as a proxy for EU ETS sectors’ 
historical emissions. To improve on the NAP data, Ellerman et al. (2010) also use CRF data and 
estimate carbon emission reductions of close to 210 million tonnes (or 3%) over all three years 
of Phase I (see Figure 2).  
The third source of data is Eurostat.8 Anderson and Di Maria (2011) match emissions data 
from Eurostat for a subset of industries to the corresponding EU ETS sectors. They also improve 
the calculation of the BAU emissions scenario for each country by including industrial 
production data, energy production, and energy prices, as well as information on temperature and 
precipitation. They estimate overall abatement during Phase I at 2.8%. 
                                                
8 Eurostat is the European Union’s statistical office. It collects data on greenhouse gas emissions by industry. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Greenhouse_gas_emissions_by_industries_and_households 
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Figure 2: Emissions and abatement in the EU 
 
Source : Ellerman et al. (2010). Figure 6.2, p. 165 based on CITL, World Economic Outlook 
database and EEA greenhouse gas data. 
 
Both Ellerman et al (2010) and Anderson and DiMaria (2011) estimate emission reductions 
over Phase I across all sectors and countries at close to 3% and show that abatement varies 
greatly across countries. Most of the abatement in Phase I occurred in the EU15 countries9  
rather than in Eastern European countries. Ellerman and Feilhauer (2008) focus on Germany and 
find that during Phase I, abatement per year due to the EU ETS was close to 5% for all EU ETS 
sectors. The authors divide this overall effect into a 6.3% reduction in the industrial sectors and a 
4.1% reduction in power generation.  
                                                
9 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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Phase II emissions 
 
Egenhofer et al. (2011) extend the analysis by Ellerman et al. (2010) to estimate  CO2 
abatement during the first two years of Phase II (2008-2009)10. The overall emission intensity 
improvements attributed to the EU ETS are estimated at 3.35% on average, or 0.45% specifically 
for the industrial sectors. In an even more aggregate analysis, Cooper (2010) examines the 2% 
decline in industrial production between 2007 and 2008 due to the recession and the 3% decline 
in total emissions over the same period and concludes that the EU ETS did not reduce emissions 
much in 2008. Kettner et al. (2011) arrive at a similar conclusion for the 2005-2009 period, 
finding that aggregate energy intensity declined, mainly in the pulp and paper industry. 
 
Electricity sector emissions 
The electricity sector plays a crucial role in abatement under the EU ETS. Trotignon and 
Delbosc (2008) and Ellerman et al. (2010) find that emissions by this sector exceeded its EUA 
allocation in 2005 and 2006, despite receiving more than 40% of the total annual EUA 
allocation. Hintermann et al. (2016) explain that electricity generators can switch fuels to abate 
emissions in the short run, which often does not require any additional investment. However, 
because of the scarcity of disaggregated data and the complexity of the EU electricity market, 
most research on the impact of the EU ETS on electricity sector emissions has been forced to 
rely on simulation models rather than ex-post analysis (Delarue et al.; 2008,2010). Thus, 
although existing evidence does not suggest a strong effect of the EU ETS on the electricity 
sector’s emissions, more refined data and research are needed to be able to draw more robust 
conclusions.  
                                                
10 Phase II was from 2008 to 2012 and Phase III runs from 2013 to 2020.   
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Estimates based on Firm-Level Emissions  
A key advantage of country level studies is that they produce an estimate of the economy-wide 
abatement impact that is comprehensive and easy to communicate to academics and 
policymakers alike. The drawback of this approach is that it does not indicate causality and that 
it may be susceptible to aggregation error. More specifically, because participation in the EU 
ETS is determined by capacity thresholds for combustion installations and for narrowly defined 
industrial processes, an analysis based on sector level data will inevitably count some emissions 
from untreated (i.e., non-participating) firms as EU ETS emissions and vice versa. The use of 
microdata at the firm or plant level solves this problem.  Moreover, microdata facilitates the 
calculation of more credible estimates of the causal impact of the EU ETS by enabling the 
researcher to compare outcomes prior to and after the policy change at both treated and untreated 
plants.11 Unfortunately, emissions data for untreated plants and pre-treatment years are not 
available from the EU’s emissions trading registry -- the European Union Transaction Log 
(EUTL – known as  CITL prior to Phase III), the main source of data on emissions and 
allocations of permits to participants in the EU ETS.  
Microdata from administrative sources 
 
Thus, two recent studies use microdata from administrative sources, which, in addition to 
being highly representative and reliable, allow for very precise calculations of CO2 emissions 
based on detailed energy use information for a wide range of fuel types. Petrick and Wagner 
(2014) link participating firms in the EUTL to a panel comprised of all German manufacturing 
plants with more than 20 employees (see Petrick et al., 2011). They find that the EU ETS had a 
significant impact on emissions only between 2008 and 2010, causing participating firms to 
reduce their emissions by 26% relative to non-participating firms. They also find that this was 
                                                
11 Such a comparison, known as “differences-in-differences“ (DD), purges the treatment estimate of confounding 
factors such as the overall decline in aggregate energy use shown in Figure 1.  
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driven by reduced oil and natural gas use, while output and electricity use remained unaffected 
by the EU ETS. Drawing on additional data from manager surveys, the authors suggest that the 
main source of abatement was the more efficient use of process heat.    
Similarly, Wagner et al. (2013) link French manufacturing installations in the EUTL to  
microdata on energy use and find a statistically significant reduction in CO2 emissions during 
Phase II of close to 16%.12 
Data on the Transition from Phase I to Phase II  
 
The studies for France and Germany use microdata on emissions prior to implementation of 
the EU ETS. In contrast, Abrell et al. (2011) use EUTL firm-level data to estimate reductions in 
CO2 emissions induced by the transition from Phase I to Phase II.13 Controlling for turnover, 
employment, profits, and industry and country trends, they find that emission reductions were 
3.6% higher between 2007 and 2008 than between 2005 and 2006. The difference between the 
two periods is statistically significant and robust to the presence of outliers. The authors argue 
that the reduction in emissions is due to the change in stringency from Phase I to Phase II (i.e., 
the lower allocation of EUAs) and not to a decrease in production. Moreover, they find that firms 
whose net allocation of EUAs was below the median (i.e. firms that were short of EUAs in 2005) 
abated the most between 2007 and 2008.  
Fuel-switching effects 
 
In order to estimate the impact of the EU ETS on fuel switching in the UK power sector, 
McGuinness and Ellerman (2008) use detailed data on power plant utilization, aggregate 
demand, and fuel and CO2 costs for coal and gas-fired combined-cycle-gas turbine plants during 
Phase I. They estimate that the EU ETS resulted in abatement in the UK power sector of 13- 21 
                                                
12  Both studies use a refined version of the DD approach in which where participating emitters are matched to 
observationally similar non-participants, as in Fowlie et al. (2012).  
13 To this end, they match 3,608 installations to the AMADEUS database, a commercial dataset that provides 
financial and balance sheet data for most European firms. About 31% of these firms are in the electricity and 
heat generation sector. 
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million tons of CO2 in 2005 and 2006.  
Findings of Qualitative Studies 
The third strand of the literature assesses the emissions impact of the EU ETS based on 
qualitative data from surveys of market participants. Although the results of such surveys cannot 
always be generalized, they often provide important insights into the underlying mechanisms that 
may be driving emissions abatement. However, as is common with surveys, it is up to the 
respondent to draw his or her own conclusions about causality. 
Löschel et al (2010) surveyed 120 German firms, of which only 6% stated that the key driver 
of emissions reductions was the explicit goal to abate emissions. However, for almost 90% of the 
firms, emissions reductions were viewed as a co-benefit of investments motivated by other 
factors, such as general efficiency improvements. Along the same lines, 94% of Swedish EU 
ETS firms surveyed by Sandoff and Schaad (2009) indicated that they would not reduce their 
production volume in order to achieve internal emissions abatement, thus placing greater weight 
on efficiency improvements to reduce emissions. Engels (2009) reports that one-third of more 
than 300 firms in Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands surveyed 
between 2006 and 2008 stated that they did not know their own abatement costs.  
Other studies present case-based evidence. According to managers of five industrial 
companies in Poland and Belgium interviewed by Ikkatai et al. (2008, 2011), the emission 
reductions that occurred during the EU ETS were due to economic conditions, not the existence 
of the EU ETS. Moreover, the perceived incentive for abatement was low at these firms because 
they benefited from an over-allocation of EUAs. Fazekas (2009) interviewed managers of 
Hungarian installations responsible for 55% of the country’s emissions and finds that abatement 
was driven primarily by cost minimization and compliance with the EU ETS.  
In another case study, Walker et al. (2009) find that four cement plants in Ireland failed to 
substitute forest-derived biomass for fossil fuel despite the existence of the EU ETS. The major 
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barriers to adoption appeared to be technical and logistical concerns, as well as a pulpwood 
supply risk. Finally, Ellerman et al. (2010) present anecdotal evidence of carbon emission 
reductions in the power sector and in selected manufacturing industries throughout the EU. 
However, they do not claim that the EU ETS caused these reductions. Although the findings of 
these qualitative studies cannot be interpreted as causal evidence of an EU ETS impact, they may 
be useful inputs to future quantitative analyses. 
 
IMPACT OF THE EU ETS ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND 
COMPETITIVENESS 
In order to comply with the EU ETS, regulated firms can either undertake costly abatement or 
buy EUAs, both of which lower their profits. In addition, regulated firms may lose market share 
to rival firms outside the EU ETS. In the case of power generation, this competitiveness effect is 
limited by the institutional and technical aspects of European electricity markets. Indeed, these 
markets are segmented due to the structure of existing transmission networks, which 
substantially limits import penetration from countries without a carbon price. For industrial 
emitters competing in international product markets, however, it may not be feasible to pass 
through the cost of carbon without losing market share. In such cases, the result would be lower 
levels of production and employment. In the worst case, firms might relocate in order to avoid 
compliance with the EU ETS policy, thus moving jobs and carbon emissions to unregulated 
countries. In response to this risk, policymakers have expressed concern that the EU ETS might 
have a cost in terms of job losses, and achieve too little in terms of reducing global carbon 
emissions.14   
Thus, a strand of the literature on the EU ETS has focused on the program’s possible impacts 
on indicators of economic performance (broadly defined), such as profits, revenues, output, and 
                                                
14 See the EU ETS Handbook published online by the European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/ets_handbook_en.pdf 
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employment. The majority of this literature consists of ex-ante assessments, which we do not 
discuss here. Rather we focus on recent ex-post evaluations of the EU ETS based on economic 
performance data from Phase I and Phase II. Ex-post evaluation of economic performance is 
easier than the task of quantifying the abatement impact of the EU ETS discussed in the previous 
section, because firm-level data on economic performance is relatively easy to obtain for both 
the pre- and post-2005 periods. Nevertheless, such analyses still face the challenge of 
establishing that any measured changes in the economic performance of EU ETS firms are due 
specifically to the policy itself, and not to another factor (e.g., energy prices) that affects all 
regulated firms. This section first discusses ex-post studies that have analyzed employment, 
output and profits. We then turn to studies examining whether the EU ETS has had any impact 
on prices or on trade flows. Finally, we review the relevant qualitative evidence gathered via 
surveys.  
 
Evidence on Employment, Output, and Profits  
A number of studies use balance-sheet data to estimate the impact of the EU ETS on economic 
outcome variables, specifically employment, output, and profits. For example, Abrell et al. 
(2011), discussed earlier, find no statistically significant impact of the EU ETS on a firm’s  value 
added and profit margins. However, for the 2004-2008 period, they find a small (0.9%) but 
statistically significant decrease in employment at EU ETS firms, which appears to be driven by 
the non-metallic minerals sector. Dividing the sample into firms with an over-allocation of EUAs 
and firms with an under-allocation of EUAs does not yield a clear pattern of heterogeneous 
responses to the EU ETS, suggesting that the stringency of the allocation does not impact the 
size of this small effect on employment. However, the authors warn that their approach of using 
control firms only from non-regulated sectors could mean that the estimated impacts of the EU 
ETS are confounded by sectoral trends.  
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In another study, Commins et al. (2011) study the impact of energy taxes and the EU ETS for 
a panel of 162,771 European firms between 1996 and 2007. They find that the EU ETS has a 
significant negative effect on return-on-capital, but that the impacts on employment, total factor 
productivity, and investment are not statistically significant. A limitation of this study is that the 
treatment variable is defined at the sector level, which means that there is likely a measurement 
error concerning treatment status and that sector shocks may confound the estimated EU ETS 
effects. 
Chan et al. (2013) analyze a sample of firms in the power, cement, and iron and steel 
industries in 10 countries between 2001 and 2009.15 They find statistically significant impacts of 
the EU ETS only in the power sector, where unit material costs increased by 5% in Phase I and 
8% in Phase II and turnover increased by 30% in Phase II.  
An early study by Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) answers a slightly different question -- how 
did variation in the allocation of free EUAs during Phase I affect firms’ employment and 
revenue? Specifically, for a sample of 419 German EU ETS firms, the authors used the ratio of 
free EUAs to verified emissions as an indicator of whether a firm’s EUA allocation was binding 
or not. They find that this ratio had no significant impact on changes in firm revenue or 
employment between 2004 and 2005, although they cannot rule out that these outcomes were 
simultaneously determined with verified emissions in 2005, which would mean that they are not 
measuring the causal impact of the EU ETS.   
In addition to using balance-sheet data, researchers have used data from other sources to 
evaluate the effects of the EU ETS on economic performance and competitiveness. For example, 
the administrative datasets mentioned in the previous section (e.g., in the French and German 
firm-level studies) provide data on a number of relevant outcome variables such as employment. 
Using confidential data from Germany, Petrick and Wagner (2014) find no significant impact of 
                                                
15 They use a DD approach. 
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the EU ETS on employment at regulated firms.16 In contrast, they find small but statistically 
significant increases in both turnover and exports during the first half of Phase II (the last year 
included is 2010). While these results hint at the possibility that German firms were able to pass 
EUA prices on to product prices, the results are not statistically significant in all of the 
robustness checks. Using French plant-level data, Wagner et al. (2013) find a statistically 
significant decrease (8%) of plant-level employment  during Phase II (the last year included is 
2010), but no significant impact on exports.  
These studies have focused explicitly on the manufacturing sector, where carbon pricing may 
have stronger competitiveness impacts. However, it is both interesting and important to examine 
the power sector because of its large share of overall EU emissions (i.e., 29.2% in 2012). Yu 
(2011) estimates the impact of the EU ETS on profit margins of electricity and district heating 
firms in Sweden for the first two years of the EU ETS, and finds a significant negative effect in 
2006. As discussed earlier, one drawback of this type of approach is that firms in the control 
group might be rather different from the treated (i.e., regulated) group.  
Because a firm’s stock price reflects its future discounted stream of profits, economists 
frequently rely on stock market data to estimate the profit impact of a policy or other events. For 
example, Veith et al. (2009) estimate the effect of both spot and future carbon prices on daily 
stock market returns for the major European power companies during Phase I trading. They find 
that returns on common stock are positively correlated with EUA prices, indicating that power 
companies profited from freely allocated EUAs and were able to pass through a large enough 
share of their price to their consumers, thus benefiting from the EU ETS during Phase I.  
Bushnell et al. (2013) provide additional empirical evidence on this issue in a study of the 
impact of carbon pricing on the profits of a sample of 548 firms, all of which are large power 
generators.17 They find that in response to the precipitous fall of the EUA price in April 2006, 
                                                
16 In addition to nearest-neighbor matching, they also employ a DD approach with reweighting. 
17 They use an event-study framework. 
 17 
stock prices dropped for firms in both carbon- and electricity-intensive industries, particularly for 
firms selling primarily within the EU. Bushnell et al. (2013) argue that these results suggest that 
investors focused on the positive impact of emissions trading on product prices (as firms passed-
through the opportunity costs of EUAs obtained for free), rather than just the negative 
compliance costs. They also find that a firm’s net EUA position influenced how strongly its 
share price responded to EUA prices. The results of the Bushnell et al. (2013) study are 
consistent with the earlier findings of Veith et al. (2009). However, because both studies use 
relatively small samples and focus only on publicly-traded firms, further research is needed to 
determine whether these results can be generalized to the EU ETS overall.  
 
Evidence on the Pass-through of Emission Costs  
The studies just discussed suggest that power companies pass through the cost of EUAs to 
electricity prices. This indicates another – indirect – channel through which the EU ETS affects 
the industrial sector. More specifically, this suggests that manufacturing firms that compete on  
international product markets with firms from unregulated countries may  be more severely 
impacted by cap-and-trade than the power sector, where such competition is limited by 
institutional and technical factors. Thus, a firm’s ability to pass through cost increases – from 
both EUA trading and higher electricity costs – to the product market is widely regarded as an 
indicator of the competitiveness impacts of the EU ETS.  
Research on the pass-through of emission costs in the electricity sector also relates to the 
controversial issue of “windfall profits” (Ellerman et al., 2016), which occur only if the EUA 
price is passed on to the electricity price. In a widely cited study, Sijm et al. (2006) combine 
price data on forward and spot market prices of electricity in Germany and the Netherlands with 
EUA price data to estimate the pass-through of CO2 costs to electricity prices. They find pass-
through rates of 60 to 100 percent, indicating a substantial scope for windfall profits. Zachmann 
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and von Hirschhausen (2008) analyze weekly electricity prices in Germany during the first two 
years of the EU ETS, and find evidence that electricity producers passed on shocks in carbon 
prices to electricity prices. Moreover, they find that the adjustment (i.e., the change in electricity 
prices) was larger for positive shocks than for negative shocks (i.e., indicating an asymmetric 
pass-through).  
In a recent study, Fabra and Reguant (2014) use plant-level data on Spanish electricity 
generators during Phase I trading to examine the pass-through of emission costs. The starting 
point of their analysis is the important insight that incomplete pass-through of the carbon price 
may be due to various factors, including market power, demand elasticity, or firms not 
internalizing emission costs in their operating decisions. They find that the pass-through rate of 
emission costs to electricity prices is 80%. They also decompose the different channels that may 
cause an incomplete pass-through and find that firms internalize the full costs of EUAs. This 
suggests that increasing the auctioning of EUAsshould not increase electricity prices in the short 
run. 
Kirat and Ahamada (2011) analyze the pass-through of the EUA price to day-ahead contract 
prices observed in the French and German electricity markets during Phase I of the EU ETS. 
Their results indicate that the EUA price explains a significant part of the variation in electricity 
prices during the first two years of Phase I. Ahamada and Kirat (2012) show that this elasticity 
increased during Phase II, suggesting that the pass-through rate increased during that time.  
To examine pass-through in the manufacturing sector, de Bruyn et al. (2010) estimate the 
stochastic relationship between industry-specific price indices in the EU vs. the US, and the 
carbon price. Using monthly price data from 2001 to 2009, they find that energy-intensive 
industries such as iron and steel and oil refining passed through a large fraction of the EUA price 
to their respective product markets. In a similar analysis, Alexeeva-Talebi (2011) finds that 
European refineries fully passed through the price of EUAs to retail gasoline prices between 
2005 and 2007. Oberndorfer et al. (2010) use the same method to study cost pass-through in 
 19 
several UK industries and find EUA pass-through rates  to weekly gasoline and diesel prices of 
50-75% for 2005 and 2006. They also present evidence of cost pass-through for glass and 
ceramics products in the UK, and for chemical products in the EU. Most studies on cost pass-
through in the manufacturing sector have been based on time-series variation in fairly aggregate 
price series. Further research at the firm-level would be helpful to increase our understanding of 
exactly how the EU ETS affects pricing in these often imperfectly competitive markets.  
Evidence from Trade Data 
 A more direct test of the competitiveness impacts of the EU ETS can be conducted using trade 
data. With this in mind, Constantini and Mazzanti (2012) estimate the impact of Phase I on net 
exports from EU15 countries to more than 100 destination countries and for a broad range of 
industries. The results indicate that the EU ETS decreased net exports for all industries except 
medium-low technology industries. One potential drawback of their empirical strategy is that 
they define the treatment variable (i.e., participation in the EU ETS) at the sector level. Thus, the 
authors conclude that further disaggregation and longer time series are needed to obtain more 
reliable impact estimates.  
In a study of the aluminum industry, Reinaud (2008) adopts a similar approach, regressing net 
imports of aluminum into EU27 countries on the year-ahead EUA price and other control 
variables from 1999 through 2007. While economic intuition suggests that a higher carbon price 
will increase net imports of electricity-intensive aluminum from unregulated countries, she finds 
a negative relationship. However, this negative relationship is not necessarily causal because the 
analysis does not distinguish between the impact of the EU ETS and a secular, upward trend in 
net imports. Moreover, Reinaud finds no evidence of a structural break in net imports following 
the introduction of the EU ETS. Thus, the evidence to date on the impact of the EU ETS on trade 
is inconclusive.  
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Evidence from Survey Data  
The competitiveness impacts of the EU ETS have been at the heart of a number of ex-ante 
studies that have relied on both economic modeling and calibration exercises and data collected 
in surveys. Because some of these surveys were conducted after the start of the EU ETS, we 
discuss them here as providing relevant ex-post evidence of the impact of the EU ETS, although 
no conclusions should be drawn about causality  
Based on interviews with senior managers at six large manufacturing firms in the EU ETS, 
Kenber et al. (2009) find that the EU ETS neither resulted in significant costs nor induced a 
fundamental shift in strategy (such as relocation or reduction of the workforce). Lacombe (2008) 
interviewed managers at five European refining companies, who reported only minor economic 
impacts on  their firms. He attributes this result to organizational inertia, weak incentives linked 
to the low EUA price that prevailed during the second part of Phase I, and industrial and 
regulatory constraints. However, given the small sample size of these studies, the survey results 
cannot be considered to be representative of the EU ETS overall.  
For policy makers, the main concern about competitiveness is not the impact on profits or 
costs themselves but rather whether such impacts trigger the closure or downsizing of business 
operations in Europe, resulting in job losses. Martin et al. (2014a,b) examine this issue directly 
using data collected in 761 interviews with managers of both EU ETS and non-EU ETS firms in 
six European countries. Managers were asked whether the company planned to downsize 
operations or relocate abroad in the near future in response to carbon pricing. In addition, EU 
ETS firms were asked whether this relocation risk depended on the company continuing to 
receive free EUAs after 2012. Based on the survey responses, the authors construct 
“vulnerability scores” that capture the subjective risk of downsizing with and without free EUA 
allocation. They find that the average downsizing risk is low because most firms report that 
future carbon pricing has no impact on their location decisions. However, the downsizing risk 
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score is significantly higher for the average EU ETS firm relative to other firms, although it does 
not exceed a 10% reduction in production or employment. Because of a substantial variation 
among EU ETS firms in both the level of downsizing risk and the degree to which such risk 
could be mitigated by providing firms with free EUAs, the authors suggest that the distribution 
scheme for EUAs should take into account such disparities in relocation risk.  
IMPACT OF THE EU ETS ON INNOVATION 
The impact of the EU ETS on innovation is of interest to policymakers and researchers to the 
extent that the development of low-carbon technologies will make it cheaper to reduce carbon 
emissions. Importantly, if such innovations spill over to other firms, they will help reduce carbon 
emissions even in sectors or countries where emissions are not regulated. The presence of such 
spillover effects suggests that even if the EUA price reflects the true social cost of carbon, the 
level of low-carbon innovation may be inefficiently low because firms are not able to capture the 
full returns on their research and development (R&D) investments (Jaffe et al., 2005). In the 
context of the EU ETS, we distinguish between direct impacts on innovation by regulated firms 
and indirect impacts observed for a regulated firm’s or industry’s technology supplier. It is 
important to note that an indirect impact requires that a business relationship exist between two 
firms, whereas a spillover occurs when the firm benefitting from the innovation does not pay for 
it. We first present evidence from research analyzing large samples of data, and then turn to case 
studies on the impact of the EU ETS on innovation.  
Evidence from Large Samples  
Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2015) analyze the direct impact of carbon trading in the EU ETS by 
comparing patent applications for low-carbon technologies across both EU ETS and non-EU 
ETS firms. The authors match almost all EU ETS firms to a database of firms registered with the 
European Patent Office (EPO) between 1979 and 2009. As shown in Figure 3, EU ETS firms 
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exhibit a larger increase in low-carbon patenting after 2005 compared to non-EU ETS firms, and 
this increase is particularly pronounced from the onset of Phase II (2008) onwards. Controlling 
for the substantial pre-existing differences between the two groups of firms, the authors find that 
the EU ETS caused a small but statistically significant increase in low-carbon patenting -- 8.1% -
- for EU ETS firms (188 patents) compared to a 0.85% increase for all low carbon patents filed 
at the EPO. The authors investigate but find no evidence supporting the argument that the EU 
ETS led to the crowding out of patents that were not classified as low carbon.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparison  of low-carbon patents (1978-2009) 
 
Source: Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2015) 
Although patent counts are a well-established measure of innovation output, they provide 
little information about innovation inputs (e.g., the financial and human resources that a firm 
devotes to R&D), which may be affected by the EU ETS in a more immediate way. To address 
this issue, Martin et al. (2013) investigate the impact of the EU ETS on clean innovation in 
processes and products.  Using responses from manager interviews for both process and product 
innovations, the authors rank firms on a scale from 1 to 5 to capture the firm’s  relevant 
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innovation input, and find no significant differences in scores between EU ETS and non-EU ETS 
firms.18 To address the possibility of omitted variables bias, Martin et al. (2013) examine 
whether the innovation score is different for firms below or above the thresholds set by the EU 
for free allocation of EUAs after 2012. These thresholds imply that firms in very carbon-
intensive or trade-exposed sectors will continue to receive free EUAs after 2012. The authors 
find that firms in sectors just below the thresholds required for free allocation conduct 
significantly more innovation than those just above those thresholds, suggesting that the EUA 
allocation mechanism had an effect on firms’ innovation decisions.  
In another study, Löfgren et al. (2013) analyze technology adoption from 2002 to 2008 for a 
panel of 700 Swedish firms in the energy sector and energy intensive manufacturing. They 
compare energy intensive firms (that are likely to be regulated by the EU ETS) to less energy-
intensive firms that are in non-ETS sectors (and thus unlikely to be in the EU ETS unless they 
have, for example, a very energy intensive boiler), and find no significant effect of the EU ETS 
on either large or smaller investments. It is important to note that the period of their analysis 
covers only the first 8 months of Phase II and that the authors do not have specific information 
on whether firms are actually regulated by the EU ETS.  
Borghesi et al. (2012) analyze innovation data on 1,000 Italian firms, and find that a broadly 
defined measure of environmental innovation is positively correlated with EU ETS participation, 
but negatively correlated with EU ETS stringency (defined at the sector level as emissions 
divided by EUA allocations). This could suggest that the policy encourages firms to innovate but 
only in sectors where the allocation of EUAs has not been too stringent.  
Evidence from Case Studies  
A number of studies of the impact of the EU ETS on innovation rely on very small datasets, 
                                                
18 This is in line with a result Martin et al. (2012a) obtained in interviews with managers at medium-sized 
manufacturing firms in the UK.  
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which likens them to case studies. For example, based on interviews with 27 EU ETS firms in 
Ireland, Anderson et al. (2011) conclude that Phase I of the EU ETS stimulated a shift toward 
cleaner technologies and raised awareness about emissions reduction possibilities.  
Rogge et al. (2011a) conducted interviews with managers at 36 companies in the pulp and 
paper sector in Germany between June 2008 and September 2009.The EU ETS was ranked only 
seventh among several determinants of R&D activities among paper producers, only 21% of 
which thought it was very relevant. Factors that ranked higher include market forces (e.g., the 
price of raw materials) and technology specific regulation. None of the respondents expected 
near-term changes, but two-thirds of them expected that, by 2020, the relevance of R&D would 
rise due to climate policy.  
Rogge and Hoffmann (2010), Hoffmann (2007) and Rogge et al. (2011b) report on a number 
of interviews with managers of (and experts on) electricity generation industries in Germany. 
They conclude that the EU ETS (i) had an impact on innovation activities specific to certain 
generation technologies and (ii) was important for accelerating research on efficiency 
improvements in fossil fuel technologies as well as for launching research on carbon capture and 
storage. The EU ETS was found to be less relevant for renewable energy because feed-in tariffs 
provided stronger incentives than the relatively low EUA prices. 
Based on a survey of 38 Italian paper manufacturers in 2006, Pontoglio (2008) reports that 
most firms (66%) were short of EUAs and that 72% of them addressed this shortage by 
borrowing EUAs. He also found that half of the firms had not undertaken efforts to reduce 
emissions (e.g., through investments in new technologies) and that the other half had undertaken 
such efforts or were planning to do so. Interviews with equipment suppliers revealed that none of 
them intended to focus on energy or CO2 efficiency as a selling point for their company or their 
products. Although these results based on case studies provide interesting insights on specific 
sectors, econometric studies are needed in order to draw conclusions about the innovation 
impacts of the EU ETS. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS  
This article has reviewed the small but rapidly growing scholarly literature on the ex-post 
evaluation of the EU ETS. The main challenge encountered by these studies is disentangling the 
causal impacts of the EU ETS from the effect of confounding factors on the outcomes of interest. 
In fact, most of the available literature to date has focused on correlation rather than causation. 
While early studies either used aggregate data or focused on a small number of firms in a 
particular sector and country, more recent studies have increasingly relied on microdata to 
establish causal impact estimates on the basis of large and representative samples.  
First, concerning the issue of carbon emissions, the available evidence suggests that the EU 
ETS has had a robust negative impact on them. Sector-level studies find that emissions across all 
regulated sectors – energy and industry – declined by around 3% in Phase I and during the first 
two years of Phase II, relative to estimated business-as-usual emissions. Based on firm-level data 
for France and Germany, there is obust evidence of a reduction in emissions by industrial firms 
during Phase II (in the range of 10% to 26%), but not during Phase I.  
Second, concerning the issue of whether these emissions reductions might have diminished 
economic performance, the empirical evidence does not support the view that the EU ETS had 
strong detrimental effects, although there is a fair amount of heterogeneity across studies and 
outcomes. Power companies profited from freely allocated EUAs and otherwise passed through 
the cost of EUAs at the margin. Regarding manufacturing, the results are mixed, with some 
studies finding a negative employment impact during Phase II, but others finding no significant 
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reduction in turnover and employment and no evidence of an effect on aggregate trade flows. 
However, in a large-scale survey among manufacturing firms, EU ETS participants report a 
slightly higher propensity to downsize their operations in response to future carbon pricing than 
non-ETS firms.  
For the EU ETS to be dynamically efficient, it must provide incentives not only for emissions 
abatement in the short run, but also for innovation in clean technologies. This is why the third 
issue we examined was innovation. Clean innovation has experienced a steep increase since 
2005, and there is robust evidence that the EU ETS caused a small part of this increase in Phase 
II. This is in line with survey evidence suggesting that renewable energy obligations and feed-in 
tariffs in power generation were stronger drivers of innovation than carbon trading.  
As a research endeavor, impact analysis of the EU ETS is still very much a work in progress. 
On the one hand, this reflects the nature of the EU ETS as an ongoing and continuously evolving 
policy instrument. On the other hand, further research is needed in several areas. First, there are 
the methodological challenges of identifying causality between the EU ETS and emission 
reductions, economic performance and competitiveness, and innovation in the industrial and 
power sectors. While some of these challenges arise from the policy design itself – particularly 
the fact that participation of firms in the EU ETS is not random – others are due to a lack of 
suitable data or other constraints. Thus, one priority for future research on the EU ETS is the 
further development of firm-level microdata, in terms of both outcome variables and 
geographical coverage. 
When examining the impact of the EU ETS on emissions, rather than using aggregate 
emissions data, administrative microdata facilitates the application of econometric techniques 
aimed at establishing causality, e.g. by controlling for aggregate shocks, differences in the 
characteristics of treated and untreated firms, differential pre-trends and other confounding 
factors. Applying such techniques to microdata from a large set of countries will improve our 
understanding of the impacts of the EU ETS on abatement. 
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The same can be said about the competitiveness impacts of the EU ETS. While firm-level 
performance indicators have been easier to obtain than emissions data, current research has far 
from exhausted the full range of relevant outcome variables. In particular, there is a lack of firm-
level studies on the pass-through of compliance cost and on the impact of the EU ETS on the 
exporting behavior of industrial emitters. Likewise, little is known thus far about the impacts of 
the EU ETS on market structure or on the size distribution of firms.  
The evaluation of the innovation impact of the EU ETS should pay more attention to clean 
innovation by technology providers of regulated industries. Another issue worth studying is 
whether clean innovation crowds out dirty innovation, as this might have repercussions for 
macroeconomic growth. For example, innovation effects entail the possibility of “green growth” 
in the EU if clean innovation spills over more easily among regulated economies than the 
innovation it has replaced. Not least, the magnitude and direction of spillovers of clean 
innovation should be the subject of a thorough investigation because such spillovers have the 
potential to reduce carbon emissions even in currently unregulated countries like China and 
India. This kind of clean innovation impact of the EU ETS would allow Europe to ‘punch above 
its carbon weight’.  
Finally, more research is needed on the underlying mechanisms behind a firm’s response to 
the carbon price and to institutional details surrounding EUA allocation. It would be interesting 
to examine whether firms are indeed acting as rational market participants, taking account of the 
carbon price at all levels of management. If instead firms view emissions trading as just another 
command-and-control instrument, they will simply pay for missing EUAs  at the end of each 
reporting period. While there is some preliminary evidence from representative surveys (Martin 
et al., 2015), detailed firm-level information on trading patterns is also becoming available 
through the EUTL transaction data base and may shed some light on this issue.  
For academics, closing these research gaps is a goal in its own right. However, increasing our 
understanding of the impact of the EU ETS also has important real-world implications for both 
 28 
improving the design of emissions trading schemes worldwide and informing the ongoing global 
climate policy debate.  
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